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The goal of the present research was to investigate whether schematic biological motion 
serves as a cue to the concept of animacy in infancy.  In order to present motion cues in 
the absence of bodily form cues, Michotte’s (1963) schematic biological motion stimuli 
(i.e., shape rhythmically expanding/contracting in the direction of movement) were used. 
The video animations displayed an amorphous shape moving in this way behind a screen 
(i.e., the shadow) and assessed looking patterns when the screen was removed to reveal 
either an animate or inanimate exemplar in the test phase. In Experiment 1, familiar 
exemplars of animate entities (i.e., dog, cow) were used as test items. In Experiment 2, 
the test objects were unfamiliar category exemplars associated with this type of motion 
(i.e., worm, caterpillar).  Infants (10- and 18-months) looked longer when biological 
motion cues were congruent with the test items in Experiment 1, but 10-month-olds did 
not show differential looking across congruent and incongruent trials in Experiment 2.  
These findings suggest that the schematic biological motion stimulus does not serve as a 
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Is Schematic Biological Motion an Animacy Cue in Infancy? 
 
The ability to recognize an object as either animate or inanimate is thought to be a critical 
step in human cognition and perception (Pavlova, 2012). Developmental research has revealed 
that this basic categorical distinction emerges within the first year of life (e.g., Rakison & Poulin-
Dubois, 2001), and can serve as the building block for more complex abilities such as the 
interpretation of causal events, word learning, attribution of mental states and biological 
processes (Opfer & Gelman, 2010). Due to the central importance of this distinction, a large 
body of research has emerged with the aim of identifying the cues that lead infants to make the 
animate/inanimate categorization. The cues identified so far can be placed into two broad 
categories: static and dynamic.  
The cues that fall under the static category are morphological, and include the presence of 
a face (Morton & Johnson, 1991; Johnson, Booth, & O’Hearn, 2001), eyes (Baron-Cohen, 
Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant & Walker, 1995; Carey & Spelke, 1994), asymmetry along a 
face-like axis (Premack, 1990), and human hands or legs (Slaughter & Corbett, 2007; Rakison, 
2005). In the early months of life, faces appear to be especially compelling to infants, with 
infants paying more attention to a schematic face (two dark areas above a mouth shaped area), 
than to a scrambled version of the same image (Morton & Johnson, 1991). In the second year of 
life other cues become important. Rakison and Butterworth (Study 1, 1998) found that 14- and 
18- month-olds differentiated between objects on the basis of wheels vs. legs, and at 22- months 
of age infants differentiated on the basis of category membership. In their second study, infants 
were tested with novel objects that were created by adding or removing legs or wheels from 
familiar objects. In this second study, infants failed to make a category-based distinction if 
shown an animal with wheels and vehicle with legs, and instead grouped objects with legs 
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together and objects with wheels together. Although animals with wheels do not exist, there are 
many inanimate objects with legs (e.g., table), so it is likely that the presence of legs alone is not 
sufficient to identify an animal. Opfer and Gelman (2010) suggested that infants must be using 
additional properties such as texture, contour, and type of material to differentiate animates from 
inanimates. Smith and Heise (1992) reported that 12-month-olds used contour to distinguish 
between animate and inanimates, associating curvilinear forms with animacy. Findings from 
Pauen (2002) challenge the interpretation that infants make category based distinctions solely on 
the basis of shared features, and support a knowledge-based distinction. Pauen reported that 
when animal and furniture stimuli were matched for perceptual similarity (i.e., similar 
identifying features), 10- and 11- month-olds were able to make the superordinate category 
distinctions.   
In addition to static cues, researchers have investigated the dynamic cues associated with 
animacy. In her theory of concept formation, Mandler (2004; 2012) proposed that an innate, 
domain-general mechanism of perceptual meaning analysis generates concepts from attended 
perceptual data (i.e., perceptual primitives). The perceptual primitives for dynamic entities are 
spatio-temporal in nature (Mandler, 2012), and are constituted into image schemas, which in turn 
can serve as the basis for the formation of more detailed concepts. Mandler (2004; 2012) argued 
that animates can be distinguished on the basis of a number of these spatio-temporal primitives, 
including being a bounded entity able to move without contact, able to move contingently with 
other entities, and able to initiate movement at a distance. Biological motion as such is not 
considered a perceptual primitive in this theory (Mandler, 2012), however, Mandler notes that 
further empirical work is needed to establish the fundamental cues used to form the categorical 
distinction between animates and inanimates early in infancy.  
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Historically, the majority of research on the role of dynamic cues in the perception of 
animacy has been done with adults. To investigate the primitive dynamic cues to animacy, 
researchers have isolated the spatio-temporal components of animate motion. Self-generated 
changes in direction and speed have been reported to lead to the attribution of animacy to a 
simple geometric shape, provided it had the appropriate orientation toward the direction of 
motion (Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000). Tremoulet and Feldman reported that adults attributed 
animacy to a simple geometric shape that accelerated or changed direction of movement. Both of 
these movement patterns (i.e., acceleration and change of direction) violate Newton’s Third Law 
of Motion (i.e., conservation of momentum) when they occur for inanimate objects, which must 
be acted on by another object in order to initiate or change their path of motion. Thus, Scholl and 
Tremoulet (2000) suggest that violation of Newton’s Third Law of Motion serves as a cue to 
animacy and forces an alternative interpretation to physical causality (i.e., the interpretation that 
the object moved because of agency). Scholl and Tremoulet (2000) set out to investigate the 
hypothesis that ‘violations of Newtonian law’ lead to animacy attribution, and found that only 
three motion styles consistently lead to inferences of animacy. These included starts from rest, 
changes in direction to avoid collision, and direct movement toward a goal.  
The importance of these dynamic cues to animacy has not been extensively tested with 
infants. As previously noted, motion-based theories of early conceptual development propose 
that biological motion per se is not a primitive feature in building a concept of animacy 
(Mandler, 2004; 2012; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). However, some aspects of motion have 
proven to be important to the development of the animate/inanimate distinction. Rakison and 
Poulin-Dubois (2001) review evidence to suggest that the conceptual system for animacy is 
initiated in infancy through primitives sensitive to five motion cues: a) onset of motion (self-
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propelled vs. caused motion), b) type of causal role (agent vs. recipient), c) form of causal action 
(action at a distance vs. action from contact), d) pattern of interaction (contingent vs. non-
contingent), and e) line of trajectory (irregular vs. smooth).  
Infant studies that directly assessed the importance of a self-generated motion cues to 
animacy report that from seven months of age, infants expect that animates are capable of self-
generated motion, but inanimates are not (Poulin-Dubois, Lepage, & Ferland, 1996; Rakison & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2002; Spelke, Philips, & Woodward, 1995). An additional animate motion 
pattern that has been tested with infants is motion path (i.e., jumping vs. rebounding over an 
obstacle).  Baker, Pettigrew and Poulin-Dubois (2014) found that by 10-months of age, the non-
linear motion of jumping was associated with animates (i.e., dog and cat), but not inanimates 
(i.e., vehicles and furniture).  In contrast, the linear motion pattern of rebounding off a barrier 
was associated with both animates and inanimates. These findings suggest that the expectations 
regarding motion paths for animates are less constrained than that for inanimate categories. As 
such, the findings support the view that motion cues may play an important role in infants’ 
formation of the animate category (Mandler, 2012; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). 
Another type of dynamic animacy cue is goal-directed behavior, a behavioral pattern that 
is a characteristic of animate beings. In order to investigate goal perception in infancy, Gergely, 
Nádasdy, Csibra, and Biro (1995) presented infants with moving geometric figures using a visual 
habituation paradigm. The authors found that 12-month-olds (and nine-month-olds; Csibra, 
Gergeley, Biro, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999) saw the actions of these geometric figures as goal-
directed. Participants were habituated to a small circle approaching a larger circle and then in a 
test phase the motion path of the figure changed.  The small circle now jumped over a barrier in 
its approach (rational) or followed this new jumping path in the absence of a barrier (non-
 5 
rational). Infants dishabituated only to ‘non-rational’ paths to the goal, that is, when the circle 
appeared to jump over a nonexistent barrier to reach the large circle. In a related study, 
researchers reported that 20-months-olds’ (but not 16-month-olds’) expectations about rational 
paths of motion were stronger for animals than non-animals (Rakison, Cicchino, & Hahn, 2007).  
Animacy attribution has also been extensively studied using the technique of point light 
displays. Point-light displays present patterns of motion with degraded object form cues by 
showing only points of light distributed throughout a moving body. Johannsen (1973) pioneered 
this work in experiments with adults, who are able to infer a wealth of socially relevant 
information from these simple displays (Rutherford & Kuhlmeier, 2013). The adult research has 
been followed up in studies with infants. Simion, Regolin, and Bulf (2008) found that two-day-
old infants show a preference for biological motion over random motion in a point-light display. 
Newborn chicks also detect and prefer biological motion in point light displays, suggesting the 
operation of an evolutionary mechanism for the detection biological motion shared amongst 
vertebrates (Troje, 2013). It is important to note the ability to distinguish biological motion from 
random motion can be accomplished at the perceptual level, independent of any conceptual 
inference (Mandler, 2012). In order for perceptual information to be organized into conceptual 
knowledge it must be processed into an abstract representational format (i.e., image schemas).  
For Mandler, perceptual processes differ from conceptual knowledge primarily because 
knowledge can be represented in abstract form and can later be recalled.  This point is 
controversial, with a number of researchers claiming that some forms of knowledge, including 
animacy perception, are the products of perceptual processing (e.g., Kellman & Arterberry, 
2000) 
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For example, researchers have suggested that the human visual system is able to quickly 
extract structure-from-motion information to infer the form that is depicted in point-light 
displays (Bertenthal & Pinto, 1994; Reid, Hoehl, Landt & Striano, 2008). In one study, 
Arterberry and Bornstein (2001) reported that three-month-old infants categorized animals as 
distinct from vehicles on the basis of point-light displays of their motion. The interesting 
theoretical question is how this perceptually based ability (i.e., encoding structure-from-motion) 
is related to the conceptual ability of using these motion cues to categorize animates and 
inanimates. There are at least two possibilities. Infants may directly recognize the motion as 
biological and form a category expectation ‘animate’ on that basis, or they may respond to the 
perception of form of the moving agent, and indirectly infer ‘animate’ from form cues.  
In order to identify the primitive dynamic cues to animacy and disambiguate how infants 
make the inference of animacy from dynamic cues, it is important to investigate motion-based 
categorization of animacy with motion cues that do not contain form information (Mandler, 
2012; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). The current study begins to explore this theoretical 
question by utilizing schematic biological motion sequences as cues to animacy in two 
experiments with infants. Schematic biological motion sequences present biological motion 
without the implicit form information presented in point-light displays (Giese & Poggio, 2003). 
The foundational work on perception of causality using these cues was pioneered with adults by 
Michotte (1963), and has since been extended to studies of infants (e.g., Schlottmann & Ray, 
2010). Michotte’s (1963) stimulus involved a square that rhythmically expanded and contracted 
in the direction of its movement (i.e., ‘caterpillar’ stimulus). In their first study Schlottmann, 
Allen, Linderoth and Hesketh (2002) found that 3-year-olds verbally reported that this schematic 
motion sequence moved like an animal. In a later study, they assessed whether six-month-olds 
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would attribute goals to this stimulus (Schlottmann & Ray, 2010). The authors felt that if infants 
did attribute goals to the Michotte stimulus, then it would suggest that early in infancy they are 
able to connect this motion style to mental state reasoning, and may use this route to infer a link 
to animacy. Six-month-olds did indeed attribute goals to the square moving in the non-rigid 
rhythmic manner of an animal (i.e., caterpillar motion) but not when it moved rigidly straight 
toward the target. Schlottmann and Ray were careful not to equate attribution of goal-
directedness with animacy, especially given previous evidence that goal-directed behavior is 
itself a cue to animacy (Opfer & Gelman, 2010). These findings might be more prudently 
interpreted as indicating infants’ burgeoning understanding of the relationship between multiple 
cues to animacy.  
The theoretical perspective that an early animate-inanimate distinction is formed on the 
basis of primitive dynamic cues would gain further empirical support if infants were found to 
associate dynamic cues with exemplars of animates (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). 
Arterberry and Bornstein (2002) investigated infants’ understanding of the association between 
point-light motion and static images of animals and vehicles. Infants (6- and 9-month-olds) were 
habituated to point-light displays of biological or non-biological motion and then presented with 
static cues from the same or a different category (i.e., animal, vehicle) When nine-month-old 
infants (but not six-month-olds) were habituated to the motion of animal, they dishabituated to 
the static image of a vehicle, but not to the animal. Interestingly, this transfer did not occur at 
either six- or nine-months of age when participants were habituated to static exemplars, and then 
presented with dynamic ones. The authors concluded that because nine-month-olds were able to 
transfer category information from dynamic point-light displays to static images, their 
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categorization was not dependent on the presence of particular stimulus attributes, and was 
therefore more conceptual than perceptual in nature.  
Pauen and Träuble (2009) investigated the transfer of categorical information further by 
investigating seven-month-old infants’ expectations about the behaviour of an animate being and 
an inanimate object. In this study, an unfamiliar toy animal and a ball were connected to one 
another and engaged in self-propelled motion as a unit. When both objects were later presented 
individually in separate locations, infants looked longer when the ball started moving but not the 
animal. These findings suggested that infants had attributed the self-initiated motion to the 
animal in the previous demonstration, and not the ball. In a second study, the researchers 
degraded the static features of the animals to determine whether infants continued to attribute 
agency to the degraded animal stimulus. They found that when the facial features of the animals 
were removed, or the fur was replaced with wire, infants no longer attributed agency to the 
animal. The authors concluded that seven-month-old infants formed category specific relations 
between static (i.e., pictures of objects) and dynamic attributes (i.e., motion patterns). However, 
these conclusions should be interpreted with caution. Although the initial finding is compelling 
(i.e., infants inferred that the self-initiated motion was caused by the animal and not the ball), by 
removing the static features of an animal (i.e., facial features, fur) the researchers introduced a 
strange new object in the place of the animal, which retained some morphological cues, but was 
missing others. It is possible that the oddity of the degraded animal resulted in no expectations 
being formed. Applying the morphological features that were removed from the animal to the 
ball could test this interpretation. If the role of agency were subsequently applied to the ball, then 
this interpretation would gain further empirical strength.  
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Träuble, Pauen, and Poulin-Dubois (2014) sought to directly investigate infants’ 
understanding of the transfer of morphological and dynamic cues.  The animacy cues in this 
study included the static images of animals and dynamic changes in speed and direction. These 
were contrasted with inanimate cues of static images of vehicles and rigid-linear motion. To test 
whether seven-month-old infants used motion information to categorize an entity as animate, a 
paradigm was developed that concealed the identity of the moving entity with a shadow. The 
goal of this paradigm was to make participants form expectations of the animacy status of a 
shadow on the basis of how it moved (i.e., to isolate motion cues from form cues). When the 
shadow moved with regular changes of speed and direction, infants looked longer when the 
shadow was later removed and revealed a vehicle, than when an animal was revealed. When the 
shadow moved rigidly across the screen, infants looked longer when the shadow was revealed to 
be an animal. The authors concluded that seven-month-old infants used motion information to 
form categorical expectations about the concealed entity. Specifically, infants expected animals 
to move with changes in speed and direction, while vehicles were expected to move in a rigid-
linear fashion.   
The present experiments employed the shadow paradigm to assess infants’ expectations 
about dynamic animate and inanimate entities, and extends previous work (Träuble et al., 2014) 
by utilizing Michotte’s (1963) schematic biological motion stimulus as a dynamic cue to 
animacy. The shadow paradigm presents infants with two entities casting identical shadows 
behind a screen in Phase 1. In Phase 2, one shadow moves with either animate or inanimate 
motion from a point midway between the two hidden entities. In Phase 3, the screen is removed 
to reveal one entity that is either congruent or incongruent with the motion presented in Phase 2, 
and infants’ looking times are measured. In the current Experiment 1, 10- and 18-month-old 
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infants were presented with Michotte’s caterpillar motion or rigid non-biological motion, and 
either animal or vehicle target objects. Based on classic interpretations of the looking time 
patterns found in the violation of expectation paradigm (Baillargeon, 1987; 1993; Baillargeon, 
Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985), it was expected that infants would look longer when the motion of 
Phase 2 was incongruent with the category of the entity presented in Phase 3 (i.e., biological 
motion with an inanimate entity or rigid motion with an animate entity). In Experiment 2, 10-
month-olds were presented with stimuli that were morphologically more similar to the natural 
entities that do produce Michotte’s biological motion (i.e., caterpillar, worm) than those used in 
Experiment 1 (i.e., cow, dog) in order to assess whether infants’ would be more likely to 
associate Michotte’s motion to these new exemplars of the animate category. 
Experiment 1 
Infants were presented with a series of videos depicting schematic biological motion as a 
cue to animacy in three phases (See Figure 1) using the shadow paradigm developed by Träuble 
et al. (2014). The first phase was designed to provide the impression that the two objects cast 
identical shadows, and that the target object could be represented by this ambiguous shadow. As 
a result, the impression during the motion phase was intended to be that the moving shadow was 
concealing the identity of one of the two objects that was introduced in Phase 1. Additionally, 
participants were expected to form an impression of which target object was making the motion 
based on the type of motion the shadow was exhibiting. When the screen opened in the final 
phase to reveal the target object, participants should already have had an expectation about what 
the object would be. The test object was either congruent (i.e., matching) or incongruent (i.e., 
mismatch) with the expectation formed. For example, biological motion was paired with an 
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animal on congruent trials, and with a vehicle on incongruent trials. It was expected that infants 
would look longer at the test object for incongruent as compared to congruent trials. 
Method 
Participants. All participants were recruited (see Appendix A for recruitment letter) 
through birth lists obtained from the Régie Régionale de la Santé et des Services Sociaux de la 
Région de Montréal-Centre.  A total of 34 10-month-old infants (M =10 months, 22 days; range 
= 9 months, 28 days to 11 months, 5 days), 20 females and 14 males were tested. Four 
participants were excluded due to fussiness, and 14 were excluded due to inattentiveness.  
Inattentiveness was operationally defined as not paying attention to the screen on both test phase 
trials that were preceded by the same motion pattern (e.g., bio/congruent and bio/incongruent, or 
rigid/congruent and rigid/incongruent). The final sample included 16 10-month-olds (M = 10 
months, 15 days; range = 10 months, 2 days to 11 months, 4 days), 8 females and 8 males. A 
total of 36 18-month-old infants (M = 18 months, 22 days; range = 17 months, 27 days to 19 
months, 14 days), 17 females and 19 males were tested. Three were excluded due to fussiness, 
and 19 were excluded due to inattentiveness. The final sample included 14 18-month-olds (M = 
18 months, 17 days; range = 17 months, 27 days to 19 months, 14 days), 6 females and 8 males.  
Materials. The stimuli included realistic color images of four objects; two animate 
beings (i.e., dog and cow) and two inanimate objects (i.e., truck and motorcycle). The objects 
were similar in complexity of features, matched for color, and could be covered by the same 
shadow. The objects that were paired with one another during the presentation (i.e., cow-
motorcycle, dog-truck) were also matched for color. These images were included in computer-
animated scenes created using Microsoft® Power Point®, and presented using a Tobii TX-300 
eyetracker (TOBII Technology AB, Danderyd, Sweden).  
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Design. Each participant was presented with four trials that included both stimulus pairs, 
both types of motion (biological, rigid), and both types of trials (congruent, incongruent) in a 
within-subjects design.  The stimuli were presented in two blocks of two trials each. The same 
pairs of stimuli (i.e., either dog-truck or cow-motorcycle) were presented twice in the first block 
of trials, and the alternate pair of stimuli was presented twice in the second block. Within each 
block, the type of motion was alternated. Thus, if biological motion was presented in the first 
trial, then rigid motion was presented in the second trial, and this pattern was repeated for the 
subsequent block. Finally, the target object during the test phase was always the same across 
both trials in the block, and the category of the target object (i.e., animal, vehicle) alternated 
across blocks. Therefore, if the target object were an animal in the first block, then it would be a 
vehicle in the second block. These pairings ensured that each participant saw two trials where the 
motion was congruent with the target object (i.e., biological-animal, rigid-vehicle) and two trials 
where the motion was incongruent with the target object (i.e., biological-vehicle, rigid-animal). 
The eight possible orders of these pairings were counterbalanced across participants (see Figure 
2) 
Procedure. The testing session lasted approximately 45 minutes. Upon arriving at the lab 
parents were debriefed on the procedure, and then provided with a consent form (see Appendix 
B) and demographics questionnaire (see Appendix C).  The parents of all participants received a 
small financial compensation ($20) for their participation in the study.  Participants were tested 
in a dimly lit room and sat in a high chair 70 cm from the screen in order to ensure maximum 
accuracy of eye tracking metrics (TOBII Technology AB, Danderyd, Sweden). Parents were 
asked not to interact with their infant during the experimental trials. The stimuli (approximately 
7.36 x 4.91 visual degrees) were presented in computer-animated scenes (approximately 40.03 x 
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23.41 visual degrees) on a 23-inch screen (1920x1080) of a Tobii TX-300 eye tracker. Tobii 
Studio (3.1) was used to present the stimuli, as well as to extract the looking time data for each 
phase of the presentation. During the presentation of the computer-animations, the experimenter 
was located behind a barrier, where he monitored the fixations of the infant on a video monitor, 
and was able to control the progression of trials.   
Immediately before each trial a visual attention-getter was presented in order to ensure 
that the participant’s attention was oriented to the screen. The attention-getter was a circle that 
oscillated between expanding and contracting vertically and horizontally, while also cycling 
through a series of bright colors.  This attention-getter was selected because it was both effective 
and, because it was stationary, did not contain any cues to animacy that have been reported in the 
literature.   Visual fixation was not recorded during the presentation of the attention-getter. When 
the experimenter determined that participants had fixated on the attention-getter stimulus, the 
experimenter advanced to the experimental trials. Each trial presented one computer-animated 
scene containing three phases. The phases were presented continuously, with fluid transitions 
between phases. Each trial lasted for a total of 45 s, yielding a total presentation time for four 
trials of approximately 3.5 min, including presentation of the attention-getter. 
During Phase 1, the stimulus pairs were presented in the left 25% portion of the display 
(10.41 x 23.41 visual degrees).  At the beginning of the trial, the pair of stimuli were presented 
one on top of the other. The center of the top object had the pixel coordinates of 225 x 225 pixels 
and the object on the bottom 225 x 855 pixels (See Figure 1 for a visual representation of this 
configuration). During the first 15 s of this phase, these stimuli were covered and uncovered by a 
semi-lucent screen (rectangular grey field made to appear like a screen covering the objects) that 
emerged and then disappeared from the left side of the screen for a total of three covering events. 
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Each time the stimuli were covered, they were replaced by two identical shadows. After the 
stimuli had been covered three times, an additional semi-lucent screen came down to cover the 
middle 50% of the display and remained in place for the duration of the trial. Following this, an 
opaque screen came in from the right side of the screen covering the right 25% of the display. 
Finally, an opaque screen entered from the left of the screen covering the left 25% of the screen, 
leaving the entire scene, including the stimuli and their shadows, fully covered. The second part 
of Phase 1 lasted for 10 s, for a total duration of 25 s for Phase 1.  
In Phase 2, biological or rigid motion of a single shadow was presented. This phase lasted 
for 10 s, during which the shadow emerged from behind the left opaque screen, midway between 
the two entities presented in Phase 1, and moved across the middle 50% of the display, finally 
disappearing behind the right opaque screen. The biological motion displayed by the shadow was 
Michotte’s caterpillar stimuli. This motion style is characterized by expansion, where the front of 
the shadow moves forward while the back point remains stationary, and contraction, where the 
back of the shadow moves forward while the front point remains stationary. This motion style is 
one of the simplest forms of motion found in the natural world, being the result of the sequential 
forward motion of two points around a single axis. A familiar natural example would be the 
motion of an inchworm. In the current study, there were 4.5 cycles of expansion and contraction 
of the shadow during the 10 s motion phase, and the movement was from left to right. In the 
rigid motion display the shadow moved in a constant linear trajectory from left to right across the 
middle section of the display. It was important to ensure that infants were attentive to the style of 
motion during this phase in order to enable them to form an expectation about the identity of the 
test object. Trials for which participants did not look at the shadow motion for at least 2 s (i.e., 
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the approximate duration of one cycle of expansion and contraction) were excluded from 
analyses.  
Phase 3 (test phase) followed immediately after the shadow had disappeared behind the 
opaque screen on the right side of the display. At the beginning of Phase 3 the opaque screen 
opened to the right revealing a test stimulus. Depending on the trial order, the test stimulus could 
be either the animate or inanimate stimulus that had been introduced during Phase 1. The test 
stimulus was presented for 15 s (see Figure 1), and was either congruent or incongruent with the 
motion pattern that was shown in the Phase 2. For example, biological motion presented in Phase 
2 was congruent with animals and incongruent with vehicles, and rigid motion was congruent 
with vehicles and incongruent with animals. 
Eye Tracking metrics were recorded for each phase using Tobii Studio and a Tobii TX-
300 eyetracker.  During Phase 1, an AOI encompassed the leftmost 25% of the display (10.41 x 
23.41 visual degrees) where stimuli were presented, and was used to determine the amount of 
time that participants attended to the first 15 s of the trial.  
During Phase 2, the AOI was defined along the path of motion followed by the moving 
shadow, forming a rectangle of 8.72 by 21.96 visual degrees. This AOI was selected instead of 
the area immediately surrounding the moving shadow because visual attention to a moving 
object often anticipates the objects’ movement by looking ahead to where the object will appear, 
in addition to looking directly at the object. During Phase 3, the AOI surrounded the target 
stimulus (located at the coordinates 1695 X 640 pixels), with an additional error margin of 0.90 
visual degrees to compensate for measurement error inherent in infant studies using eye-tracking 
data (Oakes, 2012).  
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 The looking time metric that was used for all AOIs in this study was total dwell time 
(referred to as Total Visit Duration in Tobii Studio 3.1). This corresponds to the absolute time 
spent inside the AOI and in many cases included multiple fixations to the AOI. Total Visit 
Duration was selected over alternative metrics, such as number of fixations, because there is no 
agreed upon convention about what constitutes a visual fixation in infancy (Oakes, 2012). 
A priori power analysis. A priory power analysis was conducted with the results of 
Träuble et al. (2014) serving as input metrics for this calculation.  The selection of Träuble et al. 
(2014) is justified by the fact that this is the only other study to use the shadow paradigm in 
infancy, because the current study uses a different motion pattern this might influence the 
accuracy of this power estimate.  Using G*Power (Version 3.1), specifying a desired power level 
of .90, an effect size of η2 =.50, which was converted into an effect size f=1.00. The a priori 
power analysis revealed that in order to achieve a power of .90, a sample size of 20 would be 
required in order to achieve statistically significant results at the α=.05 level (f=3.24).   
Results  
 Due to the relatively high attrition rate in this study it was important to select a method of 
analysis that would retain a maximum number of cases and would not violate the assumptions of 
standard parametric tests (Kline, 2004). Two mean difference contrasts with confidence intervals 
were used to test the hypothesis that a congruency effect exists for each motion type. An effect 
size estimate using the metric Hedge’s g was also used to determine the magnitude of the 
congruency effects that were found in these contrasts.  Separate mean difference contrasts, and 
effect size estimates, were initially performed for 10- and 18-month-olds. These analyses 
revealed that the pattern and magnitude of differences was similar for both age groups. In order 
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to increase sample size, the data were combined across ages and these analyses are reported 
below.  
 The first contrast was performed between biological congruent trials (M = 5.96 s, SD = 
3.31, 95% CI [4.68, 7.25]) and biological incongruent trials (M = 4.53 s, SD = 2.97, 95% CI 
[3.27, 5.78]). The difference score of this contrast was found to be (M = 1.44 s, SD = 3.16, 95% 
CI [-.33, 3.20], g = .45).  Therefore, a population mean contrast as low as -.33 s is just as 
consistent with the observed data as is a population mean contrast as high as 3.20 s with 95% 
confidence. The unbiased effect size obtained (g = .45) falls within the range of a medium effect.  
Although 0 is contained within the confidence interval, it would be premature to conclude that 
there is no substantive difference between these two trial types. Zero is one of a range of possible 
scores and should receive no special status (Kline, 2004).  However, the fact that 0 is contained 
within the confidence interval for the difference score suggest that replication is needed to test 
the stability of this effect. The implication of these findings is that the difference between 
congruency types for biological motion results in a moderate effect.  
 The second contrast was performed between rigid congruent trials (M = 5.13 s, SD = 
3.62, 95% CI [3.57, 6.70]) and rigid incongruent trials (M = 5.24 s, SD = 2.82, 95% CI [4.05, 
6.43]). The difference score of this contrast was found to be (M = -.11 s, SD = 3.23, 95% CI [-
2.10, 1.79], g = .03).  Therefore, a population mean contrast as low as -2.10 s is just as consistent 
with the observed data as is a population mean contrast as high as 1.79 s with 95% confidence. 
The unbiased effect size obtained (g = .03) signifies a very small effect.  In summary, the mean 
difference contrasts and effect size estimates revealed that the congruency effect for biological 





The goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether schematic biological motion serves 
as a cue to the concept of animacy in infancy.  It was hypothesized that infants would look 
longer at trials that paired biological motion with vehicles, as this pairing should violate the 
expectation that was created during Phases 1 and 2 each trial. The findings of Experiment 1 
found a moderate effect, with infants looking longer on average at the congruent pairings of 
schematic biological motion with animals, than at the incongruent pairings of biological motion 
and vehicles. The prediction of a standard violation of expectation effect was based on the 
findings presented in Träuble et al. (2014).  The major difference between this study and the 
current one was the motion style presented; schematic biological motion was used in the current 
study, and changes in speed and direction were presented in Träuble et al. (2014). Mandler 
(2004; 2012) and Rakison and Poulin-Dubois (2001) propose that changes in speed and direction 
constitute a motion pattern that serves as a primitive for an animacy concept early in 
development, whereas biological motion does not.  Indeed, in a study with adults, Tremoulet and 
Feldman (2000) found that changes in speed and direction in simple geometric shapes were 
crucial for animacy attribution. Although our findings did not show the expected violation of 
expectation pattern (i.e., longer looking time for incongruent trials), the moderate effect for 
schematic biological motion is consistent with a congruency preference. The implications of this 
pattern will be discussed in the general discussion.    
Experiment 1 presented infants with familiar exemplars of animates (i.e., dog, cow). It is 
possible that by 10- months of age infants may have had sufficient experience with the motion of 
these animals to know that they do not produce caterpillar-like motion, and this knowledge may 
have interfered with building an animacy expectation for this motion in Phase 2.  If this 
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interpretation is correct, then it is possible that an animacy expectation and looking patterns 
similar to Träuble et al. (2014) would be more likely to be observed with animate stimuli whose 
morphology is naturally conducive to this style of motion (i.e., animals without legs). In order to 
test this hypothesis, Experiment 2 used a worm and caterpillar as the animate exemplars with the 
same motion contrasts and shadow paradigm of Experiment 1.  
Experiment  2 
The findings of Experiment 1 raised the question of whether infants may more readily 
build expectations for animacy when the particular animals used in testing are more naturally 
matched to the biological motion portrayed by the shadow. Although it is not clear how much 
real world experience may be needed with the motion of animals to impact infants’ expectations, 
children as young as three years used the terms worm and caterpillar to describe Michotte’s 
motion stimuli (Schlottmann et al., 2002). Thus, in Experiment 2 we tested whether 10-month-
old infants would be more likely to show the congruency effect predicted in Experiment 1 when 
the animates were more natural exemplars of Michotte’s biological motion (i.e., worm, 
caterpillar).  
An important limitation of Experiment 1 was the high rate of attrition found in both age 
groups. Attrition is a significant problem in infancy research, especially in visually based studies 
such as the current one (Slaughter & Suddendorf, 2007).  In order to reduce attrition as much as 
possible in Experiment 2, minor changes to the timing of the phases were introduced, along with 
auditory signals when the screens opened or closed.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 33 10-month-old infants (M =10 months, 15 days; range = 9 
months, 28 days to 10 months, 25 days), 20 females and 13 males were tested. Three were 
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excluded due to fussiness, and seven were excluded due to inattentiveness. Inattentiveness was 
operationally defined the same way as Experiment 1. In order to be included, participants must 
have paid attention on the test and motion phases on a minimum of two trials with the same 
motion pattern.  The final sample included 23 10-month-olds (M =10 months, 13 days; range = 9 
months, 28 days to 10 months, 25 days), 13 females and 10 males. 
Materials. The materials used in Experiment 2 were the same as those of Experiment 1, 
with the exception that the animate exemplars were realistic images of a caterpillar and a worm 
instead of cow and dog. The inanimate exemplars were the same motorcycle and truck images 
from Experiment 1. 
Procedure. All aspects of the procedure for Experiment 2 were identical to those of 
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. To improve the attention of participants throughout 
the procedure, the speed of presentation of Phase 1 increased, resulting in the duration being 
shortened from 25 s to 15 s. Additionally, every time a screen opened or closed a brief chime 
sound was played to highlight the event. Although these minor changes would not allow a direct 
comparison of Experiment 2 findings to those of Experiment 1 or of Träuble et al. (2014), 
stemming the attrition rate of Experiment 1 was an important goal of Experiment 2.  
Results 
 There was also a high attrition rate in Experiment 2. Thus, mean difference contrasts with 
confidence intervals were used to test the hypothesis that a congruency effect existed for each 
motion type on test trials using the new stimuli. An effect size analysis using Hedge’s g was also 
used to determine the magnitude of the congruency effects that were found in these contrasts. 
 The first contrast was performed between biological congruent trials (M = 5.77 s, SD = 
3.59, 95% CI [4.09, 7.53]) and biological incongruent trials (M = 6.05 s, SD = 3.38, 95% CI 
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[4.46, 7.63]). The difference score of this contrast was found to be (M = -.28 s, SD = 3.49, 95% 
CI [-2.51, 1.95], g = .08).  The results of this contrast suggest that a population mean contrast as 
low as -2.51 s is just as consistent with the observed data as is a population mean contrast as high 
as 1.95 s with 95% confidence. The unbiased effect size obtained (g = .08) falls within the range 
of range of a small effect. The implication of these findings is that the difference between 
congruency types for biological motion results in a small effect.  
 The second contrast was performed between rigid congruent trials (M = 5.63 s, SD = 
3.30, 95% CI [4.04, 7.22]) and rigid incongruent trials (M = 5.26 s, SD = 4.24, 95% CI [3.28, 
7.24]). The difference score of this contrast was found to be (M = .37 s, SD = 3.81, 95% CI [-
2.10, 2.84], g = .10).  Therefore, a population mean contrast as low as        -2.10 s is just as 
consistent with the observed data as is a population mean contrast as high as 2.84 s with 95% 
confidence. The unbiased effect size obtained (g = .10) signifies a small effect.  In summary, the 
mean difference contrasts and effect size estimates  
revealed that the congruency effects for both biological motion and rigid motion were small. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 sought to investigate whether 10-month-old infants would expect that the 
schematic biological motion presented was made by animals that could move in this way. It was 
expected that congruency between the test objects (i.e., worm and caterpillar) and the biological 
motion cue in Experiment 2 would be an easier association for infants than that for the test 
objects presented in Experiment 1.  This association can be made on the basis of perceptual cues, 
and does not require infants to extend the causal attribution of this motion pattern to animates in 
general. Experiment 2 found that 10-month-old infants did not readily associate the Michotte 
motion stimulus with the morphologically similar exemplars. One explanation of these findings 
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is that in order to make the perceptual inference described above, infants would require 
experience with the motion of worms and caterpillars. This experience is almost certainly present 
for the 3-year-olds who labeled the stimuli as such (Schlottmann et al., 2002), but may not be 
typical for 10-month-olds. Thus, the younger infants in Experiment 2 may not have sufficient 
experience with the motion of worms and caterpillars to appreciate the natural congruence of 
these exemplars with the Michotte’s motion stimulus.  This interpretation could be supported in 
future research by the addition parental questionnaires that assess participants’ lifetime exposure 
the objects used as stimuli. 
Although the worm and caterpillar stimuli do move in a similar fashion to the Michotte 
motion stimuli, there are other reasons that they may be more difficult to associate with animacy. 
From a cue-based approach to animacy attribution, it is clear that worms and caterpillars are 
lacking many morphological cues to animacy. Most importantly, these stimuli do not have faces, 
which have been reported to be strong static cues to animacy (Opfer & Gelman, 2010). Future 
research could assess the importance of these cues by including facial features on the worm and 
caterpillar stimuli. Additionally, the importance of these cues could be tested in combination 
with the dynamic cues of changes in speed and direction of the shadow stimuli, which have been 
shown to elicit category-based expectations by 7- months of age (Träuble et al., 2014).  
General Discussion 
The current study investigated the effectiveness of schematic biological motion as a cue 
for animacy in 10- and 18-month-olds across two experiments.  Although a standard VOE 
pattern of looking (i.e., longer looking on incongruent trials) was expected based on previous 
findings using the shadow paradigm (Träuble et al., 2014), the results of Experiment 1 showed 
that infants looked longer during congruent trials for the biological motion condition. There was 
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no differential looking on rigid motion trials in Experiment 1. When category exemplars were 
changed in Experiment 2 to be more compatible with schematic biological motion, infants did 
not look differentially across congruent vs. incongruent trials for either type of motion.  The 
preference for congruent stimuli (e.g., dog ) with biological motion trials in Experiment 1 is an 
interesting effect that needs further discussion.  
Interpretation of the findings from looking time experiments with infants has been the 
subject of debate for many years (Cohen, 2004; Munakata, 2000). The decision of whether 
longer looking time denotes a preference or a violation of expectation must be made in the 
context of the study design and the developmental trajectory (Houston-Price & Nakai, 2004). 
The dynamic model of attentional preference (Hunter & Ames, 1988) can inform this debate. 
This model predicts that there can be a shift in preference from familiar stimuli to novel stimuli 
with repeated exposure.  This shift is thought to occur when encoding of the familiar stimulus is 
complete, or when there is no discrepancy between the internal representation of the stimulus 
and the stimulus input (Houston-Price & Nakai, 2004). Depending on the study design and the 
stimuli under investigation, preference shifts may occur over a relatively short (e.g., over a 
number of trials in an experiment), or long (i.e., over months of real world experience) period. 
From the perspective of the dynamic model of attentional preference, anomalous looking time 
findings may sometimes be due to such a shift of preference. As evidence for this position, it 
would be expected that individual looking time patterns should change according to the level of 
exposure to the stimuli. Likewise, looking time patterns should change as infants acquire real 
world experience with items that are related to the test stimuli. Although this account is 
plausible, it has rarely been tested using the longitudinal designs needed to evaluate the impact of 
repeated exposure (Roder, Bushnell, & Sasseville, 2000).  While we did not provide extensive 
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exposure within a longitudinal design in the present experiment, we did sample across two age 
groups (10- and 18-months). Infants at these ages would be expected to differ extensively in their 
real world perceptual experience with exemplars from the test categories (e.g., animals, 
vehicles).  Contrary to the dynamic model of attentional preference model (Hunter & Ames, 
1988), the pattern of findings was the same across age groups in Experiment 1. 
There are a number of explanations for the prevalence of null results observed over 
Experiments 1 and 2.  One possibility is that power was not sufficiently high to detect an effect 
of congruency that was present in the population. A priory power analysis revealed that a sample 
size of 20 would be sufficient to achieve statistically significant results, this sample size was 
achieved in both experiments therefore this is an unlikely explanation.  A second explanation is 
that the shadow procedure failed to accurately assess infant’s ability the form animacy 
expectations based on the motion of a morphologically ambiguous shadow.  This explanation is 
also unlikely given the success of Träuble et al. (2014) using this design with the motion cue of 
changes in speed and direction.  A final possibility is that schematic biological motion does not 
serve as a cue to animacy in infancy, a possibility that this discussion will be explored in detail. 
Our findings contrast with those of Träuble et al. (2014), who employed the same shadow 
paradigm. The 7-month-old infants in Träuble et al. (2014) looked longer on incongruent than 
congruent trials for a different type of biological motion cue (i.e., changes in speed and direction) 
than the schematic motion used in the current studies. The fact that the animate motion cues were 
different between these two studies is the most plausible explanation for the difference in 
findings. Changes in speed and direction are well-established cues to animacy in infancy (Pauen 
& Träuble, 2009; Poulin-Dubois, et al., 1996), but when he association between Michotte’s 
caterpillar stimuli and animacy is established in infancy remains an open question.  
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The only study to suggest that Michotte’s (1963) motion stimulus may elicit the concept 
of animacy in infancy was that of Schlottmann and Ray (2010), who reported that 6-month-old 
infants attributed goals to a square that moved in this manner. As was discussed previously, goal 
attribution and animacy attribution are not equivalent. Schlottmann and Ray’s findings would 
make a more compelling case for animacy attribution if not for the extensive research (Csibra et 
al., 1999; Gergely et al., 1995; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Shimizy & Johnson, 2004) that 
provides evidence that infants attribute goals to entities that do not exhibit any cues to animacy 
(e.g., rigidly moving geometric forms). Although it is possible that 6-month-old infants have 
formed an association between goal directedness and animacy, a more parsimonious 
interpretation of the evidence to date is that goals are initially attributed without association to 
animacy. 
A recent study by Poulin-Dubois, Crivello, and Wright, (2014) provides additional and 
converging evidence about the effectiveness of schematic motion cues to animacy using a 
different task. These researchers investigated whether priming with biological motion, using 
either point-light displays or Michotte’s schematic biological motion stimulus, improved 12-
month-old infants’ ability to subsequently categorize animals and vehicles in a sequential 
touching task. The sequential touching task has been used to assess categorization in infancy 
(Mareschal & Quinn, 2001).  The order in which infants touch objects is recorded, and sequential 
touching of objects from the same category at levels above chance is considered to provide 
evidence of categorization. The first experiment in Poulin-Dubois et al. (2014) primed infants by 
exposing them to a point-light display of a human walking. Priming resulted in improved 
categorization of animals in a subsequent sequential touching task that contrasted animals vs. 
vehicles, but did not impact categorization of two inanimate categories (i.e., furniture and 
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vehicles). In a second experiment, Michotte’s (1963) stimulus was the biological motion prime. 
There were two separate exemplars of this motion pattern; a square identical to Michotte’s 
original stimulus and a curvilinear shape similar to the shadow stimulus used in the present 
studies. Poulin-Dubois et al.’s second experiment found no priming effect for either exemplar. 
Taken together, these findings provide evidence that by the end of the first year, infants associate 
point light displays of a human walking to the domain general category of animates, but they do 
not yet incorporate Michotte’s schematic motion stimulus to this conceptual framework.     
Although we perceive biological motion from birth (Simion et al., 2008), the role it plays 
in building a concept of animacy remains unknown (Mandler, 2012).  Motion-based theories of 
early conceptual development propose that unlike the motion cues identified by Rakison and 
Poulin-Dubois (2001), biological motion is not a primitive feature in building a concept of 
animacy (Mandler, 2004; 2012; Poulin-Dubois et al., 2014; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). 
Perceptual associations between primitive movement cues (e.g., self-propelled movement) and 
objects can be learned without inferential thought (i.e., without engaging a conceptual process) 
(Mandler, 2012).  If biological motion, in particular the schematic biological motion presented in 
the current studies, does not serve as an early primitive for animacy, then it may play an indirect 
role. Specifically, as a result of experience, biological motion may be associated with particular 
animals that have been categorized as animate on the basis of other motion primitives. Infants are 
not likely to have sufficient experience with animals that move like the caterpillar stimulus and 
thus may not make the link to animacy. This interpretation is suggesting that with such 
experience, infants would associate biological motion (including the Michotte stimulus) to 
animacy, but only for exemplars that have been previously associated with it. A training study 
would be useful to assess this interpretation. Exposing infants to videos of natural exemplars 
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(e.g., caterpillars and worms) that move in this fashion may accelerate the process by which this 
motion becomes associated with animacy.  Alternatively, infants could be trained with exposure 
to a shadow that moves with schematic biological motion, and other primitive motion cues (e.g., 
changes in speed and direction).  If infants could be induced to associate schematic biological 
motion with other pre-existing (primitives) cues to animacy in the laboratory, this might provide 
insight into how this cue is naturally associated with animacy.  
The attrition rate of the current experiments (57.14% lost in Experiment 1; 30.30% lost in 
Experiment 2) is an important limitation. Slaughter and Suddendorf (2007) conducted a meta-
analysis to investigate the attrition rate of infants in habituation and violation of expectation 
studies with infants under 12 months of age. The analysis included over one hundred articles 
published between 1987-2007, and identified the reasons for exclusion. On average, 13.7% 
(range 0 to 62%) of infants failed to complete the procedures in these studies due to ‘fussiness’. 
This attrition rate may underestimate the true rate of exclusion of participants in infancy research 
due to the ‘file drawer problem’, that is, the problem of underreporting of findings that are not 
statistically significant. The result of a truncated sample size is a decrease in power and 
likelihood of obtaining statistically significant results, which negatively impacts publication 
success (Kline, 2004).  
Regardless of the true rate of attrition in infancy studies, loss of participants due to 
‘fussiness’ is problematic because it might not be the result of random changes in temperamental 
state. Wachs and Smitherman (1985) reported a significant correlation between mother’s rating 
of temperament and infant attrition during a visual habituation paradigm. This suggests that 
experimenters may be unintentionally eliminating participants who have a temperamental 
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disposition that is not suited to a procedure. If so, then the remaining sample of infants would no 
longer be representative of the population as a whole. 
In the current studies relatively few infants (seven in Experiment 1, three in Experiment 
2) were eliminated due to fussiness. The majority of exclusions in the present studies were based 
on inattentiveness, which was operationally defined as the failure of infants to attend to both the 
motion (for at least 2 s) and test phases of a trial.  Although the objective nature of this criterion 
eliminates experimenter bias, it may still lead to systematic elimination of participants due to 
differences in attentional ability.   
In the future, it will be imperative to modify the task to maximize the retention of 
participants to ensure the sample is representative of the population. Additionally, better 
retention of participants will enhance power and clarify whether the findings reported in the 
current studies accurately reflect infants’ inability to utilize biological motion cues, or instead 
whether lack of power is masking the ability.  The modifications to the procedure in Experiment 
2 did result in a much lower attrition rate, though the percentage of participants who completed 
all four test trials was still relatively low (30.30%).  One possible additional modification of the 
present task that might yield a higher retention rate would be to eliminate the introductory phase 
of each trial.  Träuble et al. (2014) found that presenting the static images of test items in Phase 1 
was not necessary in order to establish an animacy-specific relation between the dynamic (i.e., 
changes in speed and direction) and static images of cues to animacy (i.e., animals). They 
reported the same pattern of looking whether the introductory phase was present or absent.  By 
eliminating the introductory phase, the attentional demands of the current task would be 
significantly improved, as the trial length would be reduced from 50 to 25 s.  
Conclusion 
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The current studies sought to investigate infants’ ability to relate schematic biological 
motion cues to static images of animals. Although this relationship was not observed in either 
Experiment 1 or Experiment 2, the ontogenetic origin of the relationship between Michotte’s 
motion stimuli and the concept of animacy remains an open and important question. The earliest 
demonstration of an explicit understanding that this motion pattern is animate or “animal like” 
came from the 3-year-old participants of Schlottman et al. (2002).  There is also evidence of an 
association between schematic biological motion and goal attribution as early as 6- months-of-
age (Schlottmann and Ray, 2010). However, the recent findings of Poulin-Dubois et al. (2014), 
along with the current results, challenge the suggestion that Michotte’s schematic biological 
motion serves as a primitive cue to animacy in infancy.  
The goal of future research will be to map out the developmental trajectory of schematic 
biological motion, and its role in animacy concept formation. Researchers will need to identify 
the processes that support the development of an animacy concept, and determine whether 
biological motion is initially associated to other animacy cues before infants then generalize it as 
a cue to animacy. Exactly how this associative process unfolds will be an important goal in 
future research. It will also be important to extend the age range to examine the development 
from early, implicit understanding and utilization of animacy cues to later, more explicit 
understanding that can be articulated in conscious thought.  Schlottmann and Ray (2010) 
provided evidence that may be relevant to the potential onset and implicit use of biological 
motion cues in animacy attribution, and Schlottmann et al. (2002) presented findings relevant to 
the question of when such an understanding can be explicitly articulated.  The findings from the 
present studies are inconclusive on the question of exactly how biological motion cues become 
associated with the concept of animacy over development, but have converged on the claim that 
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biological motion is not likely a primitive cue early in infancy (Mandler, 2014; Rakison & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2001). The question of perceptual primitives remains vital to our understanding 
of the mechanisms that underlie early conceptual development in general and the core concept of 
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Figure 1. The phases for the animated scenes for the shadow paradigm.  
 
 













Figure 3. Total looking time during test phase in Experiment 1  
  
 
































































Appendix A: Sample Recruitment Letter 
 
 
Dear Parent(s),             
 
The Cognitive and Language Development Laboratory, part of the Center for Research and Human 
Development at Concordia University, is presently involved in a study examining whether infants understand the link between 
motion and living versus nonliving objects. Our research has been funded by federal and provincial agencies for the past 
twenty-five years and our team is internationally recognized for its excellent work on early child development. Our articles 
are frequently published in prestigious journals such as “Infancy” and “Developmental Science”. You might also have heard 
about our studies on national radio or on the Discovery Health Channel.  
 
The Commission d’Accès à l’Information du Québec has kindly given us permission to consult birth lists provided by the 
Agence de la santé et des services sociaux de Montréal. Your name appears on the birth list of July 2012, which indicates 
that you have a child of an age appropriate for our study. We therefore invite you to participate in one of our new studies 
and have the unique experience of learning more about your child and child development, as well as contributing to research 
in this field! 
 
Your child’s participation in the study will involve watching a few computer animated video clip. They will see novel shapes, 
animals, and vehicles moving across a screen. We will be recording his or her eye gaze throughout these activities. During all 
tasks, your child will be seated on your lap or in a baby seat with you seated directly behind. We will videotape your child’s 
responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of confidentiality. 
 
Overall, your participation will involve approximately one 45-minute visit to our laboratory at the Loyola 
Campus of Concordia University, located at 7141 Sherbrooke Street West, in Notre-Dame-de-Grace. Appointments can be 
scheduled at a time which is convenient for you and your child, including weekends. Free parking is available on the campus 
and we offer babysitting for siblings who come to the appointment. Upon completion of the study, a Certificate of Merit for 
Contribution to Science will be given to your child, and you will be offered a financial compensation of 20$ for participating. 
A summary of the results of our study will be mailed to you once it is completed. 
 
For the purposes of this study, we are looking for infants who are 10-18 months of age, who have English 
or French as a first language, and who do not have any visual or hearing difficulties. If you are interested in having your 
child participate in this study, or would like any further information, please contact Monyka Rodrigues at (514) 848-2424 
ext. 2279, or Dr. Diane Poulin-Dubois at (514) 848-2424 ext. 2219. For more information on our studies, please visit our 











______________________    
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.             
Professor 
Department of Psychology                                    
______________________    
Monyka Rodrigues, B.A.  
Laboratory Coordinator 
Department of Psychology                                    
  _______________________ 
John Corbit, B.A. 
Master’s Student 
Department of Psychology 
 
 
Appendix B: Sample Parental Consent Form 
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Parental Consent Form 
 
This is to state that I agree to allow my child to participate in a research project being conducted by Dr. 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, in collaboration with graduate student John Corbit of Concordia University.  
 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to examine children’s understanding the 




Your child’s participation in the study will involve watching a few video clips. Infants will see novel shapes, 
animals, and vehicles moving across a screen. They will also be given a series of toy animals, vehicles, 
and furniture and allowed to play with each toy for a brief period of time. In the final task, your child will be 
looking at a screen where faces speaking different languages will be presented. We want to know the 
part(s) of the faces your child will focus on. We will be recording his or her eye gaze throughout these 
activities. During all tasks, your child will be seated on your lap or in a baby seat with you seated directly 
behind. We will videotape your child’s responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of 
confidentiality. 
We will videotape your child’s responses and all tapes will be treated in the strictest of 
confidentiality. That means that the researcher will not reveal your child’s identity in any written or oral 
reports about the study. You and your child will be assigned a coded number, and that code will be used on 
all materials collected in this study. All materials and data will be stored in secure facilities in the 
Department of Psychology at Concordia University. Only members of the research team will have access to 
these facilities. Questionnaires and electronic datafiles will be identified by coded identification numbers, 
unique to each family. Information collected on paper (questionnaires) or videotapes (observed behaviours) 
will be entered into computer databases. Raw data will be kept for a minimum of 5 years. When it is time for 
disposal, papers will be shredded, heard-drives will be purged, and videotapes and computer disks will be 
magnetically erased.  
As well, because we are only interested in comparing children’s understanding as a function of 
age, no individual scores will be provided following participation. The whole session should last 
approximately 60 minutes. During all tasks, your child will be sitting in a child seat and you will be seated 
directly behind.  
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
Your child will be given a certificate of merit at the end of the session as a thank-you for his/her 
participation. Also, you will be offered 20$ for your participation. 
 
There are no procedures in this investigation that inquire about child maltreatment directly. However, by 
the laws of Québec and Canada, if the researchers discover information that indicates the possibility of 
child maltreatment, or that your child is at risk for imminent harm, they are required to disclose this 
information to the appropriate agencies. If this concern emerges, the lead researcher, Dr. Diane Poulin-
Dubois, will discuss the reasons for this concern with you and will advise you of what steps will have to 
be taken.  
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
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 I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any time 
without negative consequences, and that the experimenter will gladly answer any questions that 
might arise during the course of the research. 
 I understand that my participation in this study is confidential (i.e. the researchers will know, but will 
not disclose my identity). 




I would be interested in participating in other studies with my child in the future (yes/no): ______ 
 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY 
CONSENT AND VOUNTARILY AGREE TO HAVE MY CHILD PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
  
MY CHILD’S NAME (please print) _____________________________________ 
 
MY NAME (please print) _____________________________________________ 
 
   SIGNATURE ____________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
WITNESSED BY _________________________ DATE ____________________ 
 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you are free to contact the 
Research Ethics and Compliance Officer of Concordia University, at (514) 848-2424 ext 7481 or by 




___________________________  __________________________ 
Diane Poulin-Dubois, Ph.D.              John Corbit, Bsc.  
Professor    M.A. Candidate                                           
Department of Psychology                                                                                Department of Psychology           
848-2424 ext. 2219       848-2424 ext. 2279                      
diane.poulindubois@concordia.ca                                                                     johncorbit@gmail.com              
 
 
   Participant # _____________    Researcher: ___________________ 
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Appendix C: Demographics Questionnaire 
 
Cognitive and Language Development Laboratory Participant Information 
 
Child’s Name: ___________________________________________________   
   First    Last 
Child’s Date of Birth: ___________________ Child’s Gender:  M  F 
    MM / DD / YY 
Basic Family Information 
Parent A’s Full Name: ________________________________________________  M  F 
First   Last 
Parent B’s Full Name: ________________________________________________  M  F 
First   Last 




Phone numbers Where? (e.g. home, Mom work, Dad cell) 






E-mail:  ______________________________________ 
 
Does your child have any siblings?   
Name of Sibling Date of Birth Gender Can we contact you for future 
studies for this child? 
  M    F  Yes  No 
  M    F  Yes  No 
  M    F  Yes  No 
 
Languages Spoken in the Home and at Childcare 
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What percent of the time does your baby hear English? _________ % 
What percent of the time does your baby hear French? _________ % 
What percent of the time does your baby hear another language? _________ % 
Please specify this language:________________________ 
 
Has the child lived/vacationed in any country where s/he would hear a language other than English or French?  Yes        
 No   




Parent A age: ____________     Parent B age: ____________ 
What was your child’s birth weight?  __ __ lbs __ __ oz   OR __ __ __ __ grams 
How many weeks was your pregnancy? ____________weeks 
 
Were there any complications during the pregnancy?  Yes        No  
If yes please detail ________________________________________________________ 
 
Has your child had any major medical problems? 
If yes please detail_________________________________________________________ 
 
Does your child have any hearing or vision problems? 
If yes please detail_________________________________________________________ 
 
Does your child currently have an ear infection?  Yes        No 
 
Has your child had any ear infections in the past?   Yes        No 
If yes at which ages_________________________________________________________ 
 
Does your child have a cold today?      Yes        No      
If yes, does he/she have pressure/pain in ears (if known)?   Yes        No 
Is there any other relevant information we should know (health or language-related)? 
 
 
Has another university contacted you to participate in one of their studies?  Yes    No 
If yes, which university? _________________________________ 
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Family and Child Background Information (optional) 
 
Parent A marital status:        Parent B marital status:         
 
Parent A's Current Level of Education  
Check any/all that apply:  
 
 Primary School 
 Some High School 
 High School 
 Some College/University 
 College Certificate/Diploma 
 Trade School Diploma 
 Bachelor’s Degree 
 Master’s Degree 
 Doctoral Degree 
 Professional Degree 
 Not Applicable/Unknown 




Parent B’s Current Level of Education  
Check any/all that apply:  
 
 Primary School 
 Some High School 
 High School 
 Some College/University 
 College Certificate/Diploma 
 Trade School Diploma 
 Bachelor’s Degree 
 Master’s Degree 
 Doctoral Degree 
 Professional Degree 
 Not Applicable/Unknown 





Parent A's Occupational Status (optional) 
Check any/all that apply:  
 
 Employed Full-Time 




 Not Applicable/Unknown 
 On Temporary Leave (e.g., 
maternity, paternity, sick, etc.; 
please also check status when 
not on leave) 






Parent B’s Occupational Status (optional) 
Check any/all that apply:  
 
 Employed Full-Time 




 Not Applicable/Unknown 
 On Temporary Leave (e.g., maternity, 
paternity, sick, etc.;  
please also check status when not on leave) 





Income bracket for the entire household (per year/before tax): 
 < $22 000 
 Between $22 000 and $35 000 
 Between $35 000 and $50 000 
 Between $50 000 and $75 000 
 Between $75 000 and $100 000 
 Between $100 000 and $150 000 
 > $150 000 
 
What language community do you (and your partner) identify with?  





Other (please specify): _______________________________________________________________ 
 
What are your child’s ethnic origins?  





 West Asian 
 South Asian 
 East and Southeast Asian 
 Caribbean 
 European 
 Latin/Central/South American 
 Pacific Islands 
 Not Applicable/Unknown 
 Other (please specify): 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
What culture do you (and your partner) identify with? 





 West Asian 
 South Asian 
 East and Southeast Asian 
 Caribbean 
 European 
 Latin/Central/South American 
 Pacific Islands 
 Not Applicable/Unknown 
 Other (please specify): 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
